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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Lisbon Strategy launched in March 2000 by the heads of State or Government 
and aimed at making the European Union the most competitive economy in the world 
and achieving full employment by 2010 emphasizes in the first pillar the need to adapt 
constantly to changes in the information society and to boost research and 
development. 
 
The importance of innovative activity by firms for securing economic growth and 
welfare is generally recognized and widely documented in the scientific literature. 
While insisting on the necessity of more investment in R&D and more innovations to 
get Europe on a high growth path, Aghion (2006, p.1) emphasizes the need of “a 
comprehensive and coherent strategy which also involves: (i) more competition and 
entry on product market; (ii) more investment in higher education; (iii) more 
developed financial sectors and markets and more flexible labour markets; (iv) a more 
proactive macroeconomic policy over the business cycle.”.1 
 
Financial problems are particularly acute in the case of innovation activities due to 
some of their inherent characteristics (see Hall (2002) for a discussion). First of all, 
innovation projects are riskier than physical investment projects and therefore outside 
investors require a risk premium for the financing of innovation activities. Secondly, 
because of problems of appropriability innovators are reluctant to share with outside 
investors information about their innovations. This asymmetric information problem 
hampers the financing of innovation.  Providing convincing signals about the quality 
of the innovation project is costly (see Bhattacharya and Ritter (1985) on this point) 
and sometimes leads to market failure (due to the lemon’s problem). Thirdly, the 
difficulty of using intangible assets as collaterals also leads to increased costs of 
external capital in the form of a risk premium. Because of the differences between 
internal and external costs of capital in the case of innovation, we observe the pecking 
order theory of finance, where firms prefer to use internal funds over external debt 
and finally new equity to finance innovation investments (see e.g. Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  
 
The riskiness of innovation projects may raise other financial problems, especially in 
the case of young and small and medium sized firms. Some innovation projects may 
not be started, delayed or abandoned because of the risk of bankruptcy and the low 
value of intangibles in case of liquidation (see Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2006) for 
modeling of this issue). Attracting additional equity to finance an innovative activity 
is hampered as this is likely to aggravate the agency problem and the moral hazard  on 
the part of the inventor (reluctance to invest in risky projects due to risk aversion) 
arising from the separation of ownership and management of the firm (see e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1984). 
 
Information asymmetry, moral hazard and tax considerations (different tax treatment 
of external finance and finance by retained earnings) explain the positive gap between 
external and internal costs of capital and the preference of financing innovative 
activities by internal capital.  
 
                                                 
1 A critical assessment of Aghion’s recent work on these issues can be found in Brouwer (2007). 
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The objective of this contribution is threefold. First, in Section 2 we provide some 
evidence about the importance and the effect of financial and other constraints on 
innovations in Dutch firms using the data from the Dutch Community Innovation 
Survey CIS 3.5. Second, in Section 3, we compare this evidence with some other 
evidence about the importance of financial and other constraints on innovation from 
empirical studies on Dutch and other country data. Third, we discuss in Section 4 the 
policy implications of the empirical findings as well as some alternative solutions to 
remove or to by-pass these obstacles. Finally, in Section 5, some concluding remarks 
will be presented. 
 
 
2. Obstacles to innovation and their impact: some facts 
 
In the Dutch CIS 3.5 survey, covering the years 2000-2002, participating innovative 
or potentially innovative firms were requested to answer some detailed questions 
about the hampering factors and their consequences for innovative projects. The 
hampering factors included in the survey questionnaire are the lack of appropriate 
sources of finance, but also too high innovation costs, too much uncertainty of future 
benefits and costs, lack of qualified personnel, lack of knowledge on technologies 
needed, organizational rigidities within the enterprise, uncertainty of future market 
developments and the existence of regulation [see e.g. Statistics Netherlands, 
Community Innovation Survey 2000-2002 (CIS 3.5), 2002, question 9]. The firms had 
to answer whether in the period 2000-2002 one or several among the above obstacles 
lead to seriously delaying, prematurely stopping, abandoning and/or not starting 
innovation projects. The questions had to be answered by the innovative firms (i.e. 
firms that introduced or tried but failed or were still in the process of introducing a 
new product or a new process into the market during this period) but also by firms 
which stated that they did not engage in activities aimed at technological 
improvements despite the fact these activities were needed (question 8, CIS 3.5). 
Among the 10,592 firms which answered the questionnaire were 3,456 (potential) 
innovators. Among the (potential) innovators, 1,221 firms (11.52 % of the firms in 
CIS 3.5) indicated that they were hampered in one way or the other. Of the reported 
potential innovators that number 3,456, 264 are non-innovators who could not take up 
any kind of innovative activity since they were hampered by one factor or another. 
 
In Table 1, the frequency distribution between being hampered or not is given for 
each hampering factor. The row totals are 1,221. 
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Table 1 Frequency Distribution of Being Hampered, by Obstacle2  
 
 Hampered Not Hampered 
Financial Constraints 401 820 
Costs Too High 410 811 
Economic Uncertainty 529 692 
Shortage of Personnel 373 848 
Shortage of Knowledge 287 934 
Organizational Rigidities 322 899 
Market Uncertainty 472 749 
Regulations 194 1,027 
Other Factors 187 1,034 
No. of  Firms: 10,592 
No. of  Innovators: 3,456 
No. of  Hampered Firms: 1,221 
 
 
 
 
The frequencies of being hampered are fairly high across all hampering factors. 
Obviously, firms do not only experience financial constraints. They appear to have 
been hampered in various ways with costs too high, economic uncertainty and market 
uncertainty being mentioned more often as a hampering factor than financial 
constraints. Even organizational rigidities are mentioned more frequently to constrain 
the execution of innovative activities than financial constraints. Economic uncertainty 
(43.30% of the firms) and market uncertainty (38.65 %) are the most frequently listed 
obstacles. Of course, the obstacles are not mutually exclusive. For instance, market 
and economic uncertainty are likely to be closely related to the occurrence of financial 
constraints.   
 
It is instructive to link the occurrence of hampering factors to consequences regarding 
the smooth realization of innovation projects. This is done in Table 2.3 
 
From Table 2 it appears that the various hampering factors lead most frequently to 
failure of starting a project. Financial constraints, cost considerations and economic 
uncertainty, organizational rigidities and regulations are the reasons most often 
mentioned for not starting a project. This finding makes sense as firms are likely not 
to start projects for which the financing issue has not been resolved, the costs are too 
high, returns too uncertain, organizational rigidities and regulations are prohibitive. 
Shortage of personnel, shortage of knowledge, market uncertainty and other factors 
most frequently lead to seriously slowing down a project. Economic uncertainty and 
market uncertainty appear to be the leading obstacles for the four types of decisions.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The total number of firms, the number of (potential) innovators and the number of hampered firms 
differ from those reported in Tiwari et al., 2008, which refer to firms present in both CIS 3 and CIS 3.5 
for which no data was missing.    
3 Addition of the figures across the various actions for different types of constraints in Table 2 will not 
lead to the figure of the total number of hampered firms in Table 1 for different types of constraints. 
The reason is that a firm can have more that one project, and a single constraint can lead to different 
type of actions for different projects.  
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Table 2 Hampering Factors and Decisions to Abandon, Prematurely Stopping, 
Seriously Slowing Down and Not Starting at least One R&D Project 
 
 Abandoned Prematurely 
Stopped 
Seriously 
Slowed Down 
Did Not Start 
Financial 
Constraints 
162 135 220 264 
Cost Too High 203 185 231 266 
Economic Risk 266 238 275 327 
Shortage of   
Personnel 
151 113 246 220 
Shortage of 
Knowledge 
117 83 195 152 
Organizational 
Rigidities 
124 100 191 193 
Market 
Uncertainty 
232 187 280 265 
Regulations 82 64 110 129 
Other Factors 53 35 107 92 
Total No. of Firms that reported Abandoning of R&D Projects: 737 
Total No. of Firms that reported Prematurely Stopping of R&D Projects: 353 
Total No. of Firms that reported Seriously Slowing Down of R&D Projects: 654 
Total No. of Firms that reported Not Starting of R&D Projects: 553 
 
 
 
To measure the impact of the obstacles on each of the four decisions4 of abandoning 
(ab), prematurely stopping (ps), seriously slowing down (ssd), or not starting (ns) a 
project, we use a probit model with sample selection. The first equation models each 
of these decisions separately for innovative firms. The equation explains the 
probability that an innovative firm takes one of these four decisions given dummy 
variables for three types of obstacles, financial constraints (bfin), economic 
uncertainty (bec) and market uncertainty (binf), and controlling for firm size (lsize) 
measured in terms of number of employees We decided not to include costs too high, 
shortage of knowledge and shortage of personnel because we felt that they were 
somehow related to financial constraints. We excluded regulations and other factors 
because, as shown in Table 1, they were relatively minor. However, economic 
uncertainty and market uncertainty are forward looking and assess of the future 
potential benefits that a firm can receive from undertaking a R&D project. Hence 
these factors are about certain fundamentals that affect the firm and its R&D project. 
Also included are sectoral dummy variables for several sectors and an intercept (The 
results for the sectoral dummies and the intercept are not in Table 3). We allow size, 
economic uncertainty and market uncertainty to be interacted with dummies for being 
or not being financially constrained (denoted by –f and –nf, respectively). For 
instance, bec-f is the interaction between the dummy variables of being hampered by 
                                                 
4 The decisions “Abandoning” and  “Prematurely stopping”  refer to two different questions asked to 
the firm. While the former refers to a question asked directly to the firm, the later refers to the kind of 
action taken as a consequence of being faced by a hampering factor. 
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economic uncertainty and being financial constrained. The selection equation explains 
the probability that a firm is an innovator using the following explanatory variables: 
the logarithm of size, the age of the firm, the market share (rlsale), a dummy variable 
for being a single plant firm (d-lp), dummies for some sectors and an intercept (not 
reported). The estimation results for each type of action separately for CIS 3.5 data 
using the maximum likelihood method are given in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Determinants of Abandoning (ab), Prematurely Stopping (ps), Seriously 
Slowing Down (ssd) and Not Starting (ns) of R&D Projects  
 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
 ab  ps  ssd  ns  
bfin .385 .257 .918 .301 .912 .259 1.079 .286 
bec-f .087 .135 .353 .135 -.297 .132 .622 .146 
binf-f .161 .132 .083 .124 .338 .130 .126 .142 
bec-nf .747 .098 1.291 .170 .654 .101 1.260 .112 
binf-nf .593 .096 .674 .115 1.016 .125 .733 .107 
lsize-f .174 .064 .049 .064 .071 .063 .133 .065 
lsize-nf .107 .044 .001 .057 -.027 .048 .0003 .049 
         
Selection         
         
lsize .175 .014 .177 .014 .179 .014 .177 .014 
age -.003 .001 -.003 .001 -.003 .001 -.003 .001 
rlsale .083 .008 .083 .008 .081 .008 .082 .008 
d-lp -.053 .027 -.039 .028 -.044 .027 -.047 .028 
         
         
ρ -.469 .147 -.642 .158 -.562 .180 .311 .253 
l-lik -7,342  -6,553  -7,120  -6,801  
χ2(15) 251.12  368.61  537.60  849.21  
p-val. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
χ2(1) 
 ρ = 0 
6.33  6.01  5.11  1.16  
p-val. .012  .014  .024  .281  
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Table 4 Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables Evaluated at their Means and 
bfin = 1 for the  Probit Equation 
 
 
 Marg. 
effect 
S.E. Marg. 
effect 
S.E. Marg. 
effect 
S.E. Marg. 
effect 
S.E. 
 ab  ps  ssd  ns  
bfin .153 .105 .362 .305 .328 .087 0.358 .170 
bec-f .034 .054 .139 .119 -.107 .050 .206 .072 
binf-f .064 .052 .033 .055 .122 .053 .042 .047 
bec-nf .297 .038 0.509 .395 .236 .055 0.418 .116 
binf-nf .235 .038 .266 .208 0.366 .079 .243 .075 
lsize-f .069 .024 .019 .028 .026 .026 .044 .014 
lsize-
nf 
.042 .017 .000 .022 -.010 .017 .0001 .016 
 
 
Coefficient estimates (Coeff.) and their standard-errors (S.E.) are reported in Table 3 
for the main probit equation and for the selection equation that explains the 
probability of being an innovator. The number of observation is 10,592 with 3,456 
being uncensored (innovators and potential innovators). We also report estimates of ρ, 
the correlation coefficient between the disturbances of the two equations, and its 
standard-errors. Using the χ2(1)-statistic this coefficient is found to be significantly 
different from zero. The χ2(15) statistic tests the joint nullity of the coefficients in the 
first equation. Finally, l-lik denotes the maximum value of the log-likelihood function. 
 
 The marginal effects for the main probit equation of some of the explanatory 
variables, evaluated at their means and at bfin = 1, and their standard-errors are given 
in Table 4. The marginal effects are in general smaller than the coefficient estimates 
of the underlying probit equation and fewer marginal effects than coefficients of the 
probit equation are significant. This is not surprising given that the marginal effects 
are evaluated at sample means. The findings for the marginal effects basically confirm 
the conclusions from the estimation results in Table 3.   
 
The estimation results show clearly that financial constraints, bfin, have a significant 
and positive impact on the three probabilities of prematurely stopping, seriously 
slowing down and not starting a project, but not on that of abandoning a project. 
Financial constraints affect the least the decision of abandoning a project, which is 
also what Table 2 revealed. This result is also reported with firm data by Savignac 
(2006) and by Canepa and Stoneman (2002) for a cross-section of 15 European 
countries from the CIS2 survey. It is likely that firms that encounter financial 
constraints for their innovative activities face simultaneously other hampering factors. 
Therefore, when we allow for different coefficients for these other obstacles 
depending on whether or not financial obstacles are perceived as constraining, in most 
cases the other obstacles (economic and market uncertainty) have less of an effect on  
the timely realization of the innovative projects when financial constraints are present, 
and this difference has been tested to be significant. It is only when the firm is 
financially well off that fundamentals as future economic risk and market uncertainty 
become relevant. Financial constraints also matter indirectly by reinforcing the 
hampering effect of other obstacles. With one exception of the impact of economic 
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uncertainty on the decision to seriously slow down a project, the simultaneous 
presence of financial and other constraints whenever significant has a positive sign, 
implying that financial constraints reinforce, or are reinforced by the other constraints.   
 
The equations for the four types of decisions have also been estimated jointly by 
maximum likelihood in an ordered probit model and in a multinomial logit model 
with sample selection. Our main finding that the effects of financial obstacles and 
their interactions with market and economic uncertainty are significant and positive is 
basically confirmed. 
 
 
 
3. Review of empirical evidence on financial and other obstacles to innovation 
 
 
The existence of financial constraints to innovation is frequently studied by examining 
the sensitivity of R&D investment to financial factors. Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) find a large and significant relationship between R&D and internal finance for 
small US firms in the high-tech industries. Similar results have been obtained by 
Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse (2001) for French and US firms. Bond, Harhoff and van 
Reenen (2003) find that cash flow is not informative about the flow of R&D for 
panels of German and UK firms. They interpret their findings as indicating that UK 
firms face a higher wedge between the cost of external and internal finance than 
German firms. Actually, Stockdale (2002) reports findings from the third CIS for the 
UK showing that financial constraints is the second most important inhibiting factor 
for innovation active firms, next to high innovation costs. However, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) provide evidence that cash flow sensitivity 
of investments need not identify liquidity constraints. Cash flow may also be 
indicative of high demand and expectations of future profits. 
 
  
Several studies have regressed R&D, innovation activities, and/or innovation output, 
measured by the share in total sales of the sales of new products on innovation 
obstacles. The typical, at first sight, counterintuitive result is that innovation is 
positively correlated with perceived obstacles. At second thought this result can be 
explained by the fact that innovating firms are more likely than non-innovating firms 
to perceive the various obstacles that stand in their way. In other words, the 
perception of hampering factors is itself endogenous and co-determined by some of 
the same factors that condition innovation. Corrections for the endogeneity of 
innovation obstacles has been done in a study on  French manufacturing firms by 
Savignac (2006) and on Dutch firm data by Tiwari et al (2008). Savignac (2006) 
reports that from all businesses with more than 500 employees and a sample of small 
business firms that 17.25 % of the firms suffer from financing constraints. In the 
electrical and electronic equipment sector this proportion reaches 30.18 %.  She 
estimates that financing constraints reduce by 22% the probability to implement 
innovation projects, that the existence of financial constraints on innovation decreases 
with firm size, and that financing problems also depend on sectors, ex-ante financing 
structure and past economic performance. Tiwari et al. (2008) using the Dutch CIS3.5 
data conclude that financial constraints adversely affect R&D, and that financial 
constraints are the major stumbling block in the pursuit of R&D. They also find that 
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older firms and firms that do belong to a group are less likely to be financially 
constrained. 
 
Using CIS 2 data for European countries, Canepa and Stoneman (2002) find that 
financial constraints have more of an impact on not starting, delaying or postponing 
projects than other internal or external hampering factors. Financial constraints are 
found to matter more in market based systems than in bank based systems (a finding 
that is in line with that of Bond et al. (2003) for Germany and the UK) and the  more  
the riskier and newer industries are.  Both Savignac (2006) and Canepa and Stoneman 
(2002) confirm our finding reported in section 2 that financial constraints lead less 
often to the abandonment of projects than to them not being started or being delayed. 
 
Another sort of evidence that R&D is contrained by financing difficulties are the 
studies conducted in many countries about the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. In 
a recent econometric study on the effectiveness of the Dutch WBSO scheme (Wet 
bevordering speur - en ontwikkelingswerk ) Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) conclude 
that the WBSO program has been effective in reducing the user cost of R&D and 
therefore successful in stimulating firm R&D expenditures. According to their results 
WBSO has the largest impact in the first period after which the effect of the tax 
incentives declines. They find that the effect is the larger for smaller firms and is 
smaller for the larger firms. The R&D additionality of WBSO points to the existence 
of financial constraints. By lowering  the cost of conducting R&D, the R&D incentive 
scheme stimulates additional R&D expenditures by private business firms. 
 
 
Financial constraints as a hampering factor for innovations has been extensively dealt 
with in the literature. Other obstacles to innovations have received some attention too 
in the theoretical and empirical literature. For instance, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith and Howitt (2005) and Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Pranti (2006) 
provide evidence on the increased beneficial effects of competition and entry 
respectively on innovative activity in industries close to the technology frontier. 
Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2006) find positive effects on entry of new firms and 
their post-entry growth of financial development, regulations affecting start-up costs 
and regulations on hiring and firing employees. As these other obstacles have been 
found to have a significant impact on innovative activity, they deserve more attention 
by researchers. 
 
 
4. Discussion of the empirical findings and of their policy implications 
 
The finding that about 11.52 % of the firms that answered the questionnaire reported 
to have been hampered in one way or the other and that about 3.8 % reported to have 
been financially constrained may be reassuring, especially when it is compared to the 
17.25 % of firms in France found by Savignac (2006) to be financially constrained. 
 
Realizing that almost one out of three innovative or potentially innovative firms (i.e. 
1,221 out of 3,456 firms or 35.3 %) have been hampered and 15,3 % of innovative 
firms (529 out of 3,456 firms) have been hampered by at least one factor and that the 
major hampering factors were found to have a significant detrimental impact on 
decisions of abandoning, prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down or not starting 
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innovative projects (See Table 3) should be reason for serious concern. There is even 
more reason for being concerned when one realizes that these figures might 
underestimate the true proportions of constrained innovative firms. Reasons for 
underestimation are the likely higher attrition rate among constrained firms leading to 
a survivorship bias of unconstrained firms. 
 
Another reason might be that because a combination of a census of large enterprises 
(firms with 250 or more employees) and a stratified random sample is used for the 
CIS, small firms are underrepresented in the survey. Small firms often face more 
severe constraints than large enterprises so that figures for the complete survey are not 
necessarily representative for the population of small firms. 
 
To assess the importance of the figures on financial constraints, one has to realize that 
policy measures have been taken long ago and that venture capital and other forms of 
private equity have become a major source of financing of innovation activities. Since 
long tax subsidies are provided through expensing R&D in many countries, special 
financing schemes are available for small, innovative enterprises in many countries 
(e.g. the US SBIR/SBIC programs, financing of patent projects by the Swedish 
government, see Svensson, 2007).  
 
Moreover, in the last decade venture capitalists have provided an increasing share of 
the financing of early stage investment. For instance, Engel and Keilbach (2007) state 
that between 1995 and 2000 the volume of newly closed deals by venture capital in 
Germany increased by a factor 8, in the years between 2001 and 2004 however it 
decreased. Kortum and Lerner (2000) provide evidence that while the ratio of venture 
capital to R&D averaged less than 3 % from 1983-1992, venture capital may have 
accounted for 8 % of innovations in the same period.  
 
Venture capital provides financing and contributes to reducing the information 
asymmetry and the moral hazard through active involvement with the enterprise and 
through increased leverage (see e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) on the complexity 
of the VC contracts and Gompers (1995) on the structure of staged venture capital 
investments when agency and monitoring costs exist). Hellmann and Puri (2002) 
provide evidence for Silicon Valley start-ups that venture capitalists play important 
roles in the professionalization of these start-ups over and beyond those of traditional 
financial intermediaries. 
 
However, venture capital is not the panacea. The findings for German firms by Engel 
and Keilbach (2007) which are somewhat at variance with those of Kortum and 
Lerner (2000) suggest that the higher innovativeness and growth rates of venture-
funded enterprises is due to the selection process by venture capitalists using patent 
applications as a selection criterion. This would mean that venture capital is not 
available for firms that are not able to convincingly signal growth perspectives to an 
external investor by providing patent applications. The importance of patents as 
signals to attract venture capital is also documented for Quebec biotechnology firms 
by Niosi et al. (2002). 
 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2007) document the venture capitalist 
industry’s volatility over the period 1975-1998 and show that its investments are 
closely tied to valuations in public stock markets, i.e. they increase when signals of 
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public stock markets become favorable. Rates of return on venture capital appear to 
be highly correlated with those on public stock markets (see also Cochrane, 2005, 
Kaplan and Schoar, 2005, Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003).  More generally, as 
shown by Black and Gilson (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (2001) venture capital 
works best when there is an active equity market which allows investors to exit by 
selling their shares. 
 
Another policy aspect that has been shown to be important by looking at the responses 
to the obstacles to innovation is the issue of complementarity of innovation policies, 
something that is also called “the policy mix” in current discussions in European 
policy circles. Indeed, as the descriptive statistics reported in Section 2 have shown, 
firms face a number of obstacles in their attempts to innovate. If only one obstacle 
was important, the problem would be easy to solve, but if various obstacles co-exist, it 
is necessary to introduce a policy package, taking into account the complementarity 
and substitution between various policies. In two similar studies examining the joint 
occurrence of reported innovation obstacles in innovation surveys, Mohnen and Rosa 
(2002) on Canadian data and Galia and Legros (2004) on French data conclude that 
many signs exist of complementarity between obstacles, in the sense that obstacles 
tend to be reported jointly even after controlling for other covariates.  
 
Mohnen and Röller (2005) consider the obstacles to innovation as indications of 
failures or weaknesses in the corresponding innovation policies. They examine 
whether innovation policies are complements or substitutes in the sense of reinforcing 
their negative effect on innovation behavior and innovation output. They conclude 
that the two phases of innovation, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and 
the intensity of innovation, are subject to different constraints. The evidence seems to 
suggest that substitutability among policies is more often the norm as far as the 
intensity of innovation is concerned and complementarity as far as making firms 
innovative is concerned. When it comes to turn non-innovators into innovators, it is 
important to remove a bunch of obstacles at the same time. Governments should adopt 
a mix of policies, for instance easing access to finance and allowing firms to 
cooperate with other firms and technological institutions, or increasing the amount of 
skilled personnel and reducing the regulatory burden. When it comes to increasing the 
amount of innovation, one or the other policy will do: easing access to finance, 
making more skilled labor available, or allowing for more collaborations. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the nature and the degree of obstacles, in particular 
financial constraints, to innovative activity using statistical information from CIS 3.5 
for the Netherlands. We have studied the impact on firm decisions to abandoning, 
prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down or desisting from starting an innovative 
project as a result from the occurrence of hampering factors. Our analysis led us to 
conclude that the constraints faced by innovative firms are important and have had a 
major negative impact on innovative activity. Financial constraints continue to 
hamper innovative activity despite the fact that the tax treatment of R&D is favorable 
to innovations, that there exist programs to support small innovative firms and that the 
venture capital sector experienced a significant growth over recent decades. Other 
types of financing of innovations such as business angel finance contribute to mitigate 
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the financing problem of many young, small firms but in terms of size this type of 
finance is of less importance than venture capital (see Berger and Udell, 1998).  
 
Our empirical findings are very much in line with the conclusions by Aghion (2006)  
about the important beneficial effects on economic growth of the absence of barriers 
to competition and entry, of spending on education reducing the shortage of qualified 
labor, of financial development or appropriate fiscal policy providing the required 
finance to innovative activity and of increased flexibility of labor market and 
reduction of regulation affecting start-up costs.  
 
Hampering factors such as shortage of qualified human resources have received less 
attention in the innovation literature than financial constraints. This is an unjustified 
omission which calls for more research into the obstacles to innovative activity and 
economic growth and also for collecting more refined statistical information on these 
obstacles and their economic impact. 
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